Safety out of control: dopamine and defence by Lloyd, K & Dayan, P
Lloyd and Dayan  Behav Brain Funct  (2016) 12:15 
DOI 10.1186/s12993-016-0099-7
REVIEW
Safety out of control: dopamine 
and defence
Kevin Lloyd* and Peter Dayan
Abstract 
We enjoy a sophisticated understanding of how animals learn to predict appetitive outcomes and direct their behav-
iour accordingly. This encompasses well-defined learning algorithms and details of how these might be implemented 
in the brain. Dopamine has played an important part in this unfolding story, appearing to embody a learning signal 
for predicting rewards and stamping in useful actions, while also being a modulator of behavioural vigour. By contrast, 
although choosing correct actions and executing them vigorously in the face of adversity is at least as important, our 
understanding of learning and behaviour in aversive settings is less well developed. We examine aversive processing 
through the medium of the role of dopamine and targets such as D2 receptors in the striatum. We consider critical 
factors such as the degree of control that an animal believes it exerts over key aspects of its environment, the distinc-
tion between ‘better’ and ‘good’ actual or predicted future states, and the potential requirement for a particular form 
of opponent to dopamine to ensure proper calibration of state values.
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Background
Our comprehension of appetitive Pavlovian and instru-
mental conditioning at multiple levels of theory and 
experiment has progressed dramatically over the last few 
years. We now enjoy a richly detailed picture, encompass-
ing computational questions about the sorts of prediction 
and optimization that animals perform, and priors over 
these; algorithmic issues about the nature of different 
sorts of learning that get recruited and exploited in vari-
ous circumstances; and implementational details about 
the involvement of many structures, including substan-
tial pre-frontal cortical areas, the amygdala, the striatum, 
and also their respective dopaminergic neuromodulation 
[1–8]. Along with this evolving understanding of discrete 
choice, there is evidence that the vigour of engagement in 
actions is also partly determined through dopaminergic 
mechanisms associated with the assignment of positive 
valence, ensuring an alignment of incentive and activity 
[9–16].
By contrast, the case of aversive Pavlovian and instru-
mental conditioning is rather less well understood. 
Perhaps the most venerable puzzle concerns the instru-
mental case of active avoidance: how could it be that the 
desired absence of an aversive outcome can influence the 
choice and motivation of behaviour [17–22]? However, 
implementational considerations about the architec-
ture of control make for extra problems—if, for instance, 
vigorous engagement in actions associated with active 
defence requires recruitment of mechanisms normally 
thought of as being associated with rewards rather than 
(potential) punishments [23, 24]. Further, there are alter-
native passive and active defensive strategies that impose 
seemingly opposite demands on these systems [25, 26].
In this review, we examine aversion through the 
medium of dopamine and some of its key targets. Dopa-
mine is by no means the only, or perhaps even the most 
important, implementational facet of negative valence. 
For instance, as we will see, complex, species-specific, 
defensive systems provide an elaborate hard-wired 
mosaic of responsivity to a panoply of threatening cues 
[27–29]. Furthermore, cortically-based methods of rea-
soning that can incorporate and calculate with intri-
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to which environmental contingencies afford control, 
play a crucial role in modulating these defences [30–32]. 
Nevertheless, dopamine is well suited to the purpose of 
elucidating aversion because of the role it plays in the 
above enigmas via its influence over learned choice and 
vigour. Of dopamine’s targets, our principal focus here 
is the striatum, with particular attention to D2 receptors 
because of their seemingly special role in passive forms of 
behavioural inhibition [8, 33].
Almost all the elements of this account have been aired 
in previous analyses of appetitive and aversive neural 
reinforcement learning, with the role of dopamine also 
attracting quite some attention [34–40]. Our main aims 
are to weave these threads together, using the sophis-
ticated view of appetitive conditioning as a foundation 
for our treatment of the aversive case, and to highlight 
issues that remain contentious or understudied. The issue 
of behavioural control will turn out to be key. We first 
outline a contemporary view of appetitive conditioning. 
We then use this to decompose and then recompose the 
issues concerning innate and learned defence.
Prediction and control of rewards
Reinforcement learning (RL) addresses the following 
stark problem: learn to choose actions which maximize 
the sum of a scalar utility or reward signal over the future 
by interacting with an initially unknown environment. 
Such environments comprise states or locations, and 
transitions between these states that may be influenced 
by actions. What make this problem particularly chal-
lenging are both the trial-and-error nature of learn-
ing—the effect of actions must be discovered by trying 
them—and the possibility that actions affect not only 
immediate but also delayed rewards by changing which 
states are occupied in the future [41].
Two broad classes of RL algorithms address this 
computational problem: model-based and model-free 
methods [41, 42]. Briefly, model-based methods use 
experience to construct an internal model of the struc-
ture of the environment (i.e. its states and transitions) 
and the outcomes it affords. Prediction and planning 
based on the model can then be used to make appropri-
ate choices. Assuming the possibility of constant re-esti-
mation, the flexibility afforded by this class of methods to 
changes in contingency (i.e. to environmental structure) 
and motivational state (i.e. to outcome values) has led 
to the suggestion that it is suitable as a model of goal-
directed action [43–46]. Model-based estimates can also 
encompass comparatively sophisticated ‘meta-statistics’ 
of the environment, such as the degree to which rewards 
and punishments are under the control of the agent [32].
By contrast, model-free methods do not construct an 
internal model, but rather learn simpler quantities in the 
service of the same goal. One such is the mean value of a 
state, which summarizes how good it is as judged by the 
cumulative rewards that are expected to accrue in the 
future when the subject starts from that state. This is, of 
course, the quantity that requires optimization. Crucially, 
the values of successive states satisfy a particular consist-
ency relationship [47], so that states which tend to lead 
to states of high value will also tend to have high value, 
and vice-versa for states which tend to lead to low-value 
states. A broad class of model-free RL methods, known 
as temporal difference (TD) methods, use inconsistencies 
in the values of sampled successive states—a TD predic-
tion error signal—to improve estimates of state values 
[48].
For selecting appropriate actions, a prominent model-
free method is the actor-critic [41, 49]. This involves two 
linked processes. One is the critic, which uses the TD 
error to learn the model-free value of each state. How-
ever, future rewards typically depend on the actions 
chosen, or the behavioural policy followed. A policy is a 
state-response mapping, and is stored in the other com-
ponent, the actor, which determines the relative proba-
bilities of selecting actions. It turns out that the same TD 
prediction error that can improve the predictions of the 
critic may also be employed to improve the choices of the 
actor. There are also other model-free quantities that can 
be used for action selection. These include the Q value 
[50] of a state-action pair, which reports the expected 
long-run future reward for taking the particular initial 
action at the state.
Such model-free methods have the virtue of being 
able to learn to choose good actions without estimating 
a world model. However, summarizing experience by 
simple state values also means that these methods are 
relatively inflexible in the face of changes in environmen-
tal contingencies. Consequently, model-free RL meth-
ods have been suggested as a possible model of habitual 
actions [44, 45].
Both model-based and model-free methods must bal-
ance exploration and exploitation. The former is neces-
sary to learn the possibilities associated with a novel 
domain; the latter then garners the rewards (or avoids the 
punishments) that the environment has been discovered 
to afford. This balance depends sensitively on many fac-
tors, including prior expectations about the opportuni-
ties and threats in the environment, how much control 
can be exerted over them, and how fast they change [51]. 
It also requires careful modelling of uncertainty—for 
instance, it is possible to quantify the value of exploration 
of unknown options as a function of the expected worth 
of the exploitation that they could potentially allow in 
the future [52, 53]. The excess of this over the expected 
value given current information is sometimes known as 
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an exploration bonus, quantifying optimism in the face of 
uncertainty [54, 55].
Calculating such bonuses correctly, balancing explo-
ration and exploitation optimally, and even just finding 
the optimal trajectory of actions in a rich state space, are 
radically computational intractable; heuristics therefore 
abound which are differently attuned to different classes 
of method [51]. Perhaps the most important heuristic is 
the existence of hard-wired systems that embody pre-
specified policies. As we will detail below, these are of 
particular value in the face of mortal threat—animals will 
rarely have the luxury of being able to explore to find the 
best response. However, they are also useful in appetitive 
cases, obviating learning for actions that are sufficiently 
evolutionarily stable, such as in food-handling, mating 
and parenting.
Such hard-wired behaviours may be elicited in the 
absence of learning by certain stimuli, which are there-
fore designated unconditioned stimuli (USs). Presen-
tation of a US typically inspires what is known as a 
consummatory response, attuned to the particularities 
of the US. It is through Pavlovian, or classical, condition-
ing that such innate responses can be attached not only 
to USs but also to formerly neutral predictors of such 
outcomes. These predictors are then called conditioned 
stimuli (CSs) since their significance is ‘conditioned’ by 
experience. Along with targeted preparation for particu-
lar outcomes, CS-elicited conditioned responses (CRs) 
include generic, so-called preparatory, actions: typically 
approach and engagement for appetitive cues, associated 
with predictions of rewarding outcomes; and inhibition, 
disengagement and withdrawal for aversive cues, associ-
ated with future threats or punishments. The predictions 
that underpin preparation can be either model-based or 
model-free [56]. We should note that the long-standing 
distinction between preparatory and consummatory 
behaviours [57–59] is not always clear cut; however, it 
has been usefully invoked—though not always in exactly 
the same terms—in various related theories of dopamine 
function [11, 60–66].
The fuller case of RL, in which actions come to be 
chosen because of their contingent effects rather than 
being automatically elicited by predictions, corresponds 
to instrumental conditioning. At least in experimental 
circumstances such as negative automaintenance [67], 
automatic, Pavlovian, responses can be placed in direct 
competition with instrumental choices. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, Pavlovian responses often win [68, 69], leading to 
inefficient behaviour. A less malign interaction between 
Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning is called ’Pavlo-
vian-instrumental transfer’ (PIT) [45, 70–73]. In this, the 
vigour of instrumental responding (typically for rewards) 
is influenced positively or negatively by the presence of 
Pavlovian CSs associated with appetitive or aversive pre-
dictions, respectively.
We start by considering the implications of Pavlovian 
and instrumental paradigms for the neural realization of 
control. We use a rather elaborated discussion of appe-
titive conditioning and rewards as a foundation, since 
this valence has received more attention and so is better 
understood. As a preview, we will see that dopamine in 
the ventral striatum has a special involvement in model-
free learning (reporting the TD prediction error). How-
ever, dopamine likely also plays an important role in the 
expression and invigoration of both model-based and 
model-free behaviour.
Predicting reward: Pavlovian conditioning
Model-free RL, with its TD prediction errors, has played 
a particularly central role in developing theories of how 
animals learn state values, the latter interpreted as the 
predictions of long run rewards that underpin Pavlovian 
responses [74–77]. There is by now substantial evidence 
that the phasic activity of midbrain dopamine neurons 
resembles this TD prediction error in the case of reward 
[40, 78, 79]. Neural systems in receipt of this dopamine 
signal are then prime candidates to represent state val-
ues. One particularly important such target is the cortical 
projection to the ventral striatum (or nucleus accumbens; 
NAc) [78, 80], the plasticity of whose synaptic efficacies 
may be modulated by dopamine [81–85]. Note that, by 
contrast, dorsomedial and dorsolateral striatum, which 
are also targeted by dopamine cells—though by cells in 
the substantia nigra (SNc) rather than in the ventral teg-
mental area (VTA)—have been associated respectively 
with model-based and model-free instrumental behav-
iour (see below).
Along with its involvement in plasticity, dopamine, 
particularly in the NAc, has long been implicated in the 
intensity of the expression of innate, motivated behav-
iours (i.e., just those behaviours elicited by Pavlovian 
predictions) in response to both unconditioned and con-
ditioned stimuli [66, 86, 87]. This is a form of Pavlovian 
vigour [63, 64, 88–91]. Relevant CSs have been described 
as acquiring ‘incentive salience’ [65, 92] or ‘incentive 
motivation’ [93], possibly via the way that their onset 
leads to TD errors that reflect state predictions [94]. Per-
haps also related to Pavlovian vigour is the observation 
that the influence of CSs on instrumental responding in 
PIT paradigms is sensitive to dopamine signalling too 
[95–97]. It has recently been shown that dopaminergic 
projections to ventral striatum corelease glutamate [98–
100], though see [101], which may modulate these effects.
The influence of dopamine neurons over the expres-
sion of behaviour might extend to model-based as well 
as model-free predictions, based on other afferent 
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projections to the dopamine system. Model-based val-
ues are thought to be stored in, and calculated by, other 
areas, such as the basolateral amygdala and orbitofrontal 
cortex [87, 102–109].
Three further details of the ventral striatum and dopa-
mine release in this structure are important. Firstly, ana-
tomically, the NAc is classically subdivided into ‘core’ 
(NAcC) and ‘shell’ (NAcS) subregions [110]. As well as 
being histochemically distinct, these regions differ in 
their patterns of connectivity. For example, while NAcC 
resembles dorsal striatum in projecting extensively to 
classic basal ganglia output structures, such as the ventral 
pallidum, NAcS is notable for its projections to subcor-
tical structures outside the basal ganglia, such as lateral 
hypothalamus and periaqueductal gray (PAG), which 
are involved in the expression of unlearned behaviours 
[110–114].
Two related ideas are abroad about the separate roles 
of these structures. One is that NAcS and NAcC medi-
ate the motivational impact of USs and CSs, respectively 
[87]. For instance, the projection of NAcS to the lateral 
hypothalamus is known to play a role in the expression 
of feeding behaviour [112], requiring intact dopamine 
signalling within NAcS [115]. Conversely, conditioned 
approach is impaired by lesions or dopamine depletion of 
NAcC, but not by lesions of NAcS [116, 117].
The other idea is that NAcS and NAcC are involved in 
outcome-specific and general PIT, respectively [118]. The 
difference concerns whether the Pavlovian prediction is 
of the same outcome as for the instrumental act (specific 
PIT), or instead exerts influence according to its valence 
(general PIT). It has been reported that lesions of NAcS 
abolished outcome-specific PIT but spared general PIT, 
while lesions of NAcC abolished general PIT but spared 
outcome-specific PIT [118].
These ideas are not quite compatible, since both sorts 
of PIT involve conditioned stimuli. Perhaps, instead, we 
should think of the NAcC as being more involved in pre-
paratory behaviours, attuned only to the valence (positive 
or negative) of a predicted outcome but not its particu-
larities, while the NAcS is more involved in consumma-
tory behaviours, which additionally reflect knowledge 
of the particular expected outcome(s) [118–123]. This is 
less incompatible with the first idea than it might seem, 
since outcome-specific PIT presumably relies on repre-
sentation of the US, even if the US itself is not physically 
present [56]. This latter interpretation aligns with the dis-
tinction between model-free and model-based RL pre-
dictions, which would then be associated with NAcC and 
NAcS, respectively [56].
The second relevant, if somewhat contentious (see 
below), feature is that, as appears to be the case in 
the striatum generally, the majority of the principal 
projection neurons in NAc—medium spiny neurons 
(MSNs)—may express either D1 or D2 receptors, but 
not both [124, 125]. Briefly, dopamine receptors are cur-
rently thought to come in five subtypes, each classified as 
belonging to one of two families based on their oppos-
ing effects on certain intracellular cascades: D1-like (D1 
and D5 receptors), and D2-like (D2, D3, and D4 recep-
tors). D1 and D2 receptors are of prime interest here since 
they are by far the most abundantly expressed dopamine 
receptors in the striatum and throughout the rest of 
the brain [126–128]. In the striatum, the majority of D1 
and D2 receptors are thought to occupy states in which 
their affinities for dopamine are low and high respec-
tively [129], with the consequence that these receptors 
are influenced differently by changes in phasic and tonic 
dopamine release [130]. Furthermore, D1 and D2 recep-
tors appear to mediate opposite effects of dopamine on 
their targets: activation of D1 receptors tends to excite, 
and D2 to inhibit, neurons; this modulation of excitability 
can then also have consequences for activity-dependent 
plasticity [131, 132].
In the dorsal striatum, there is substantial evidence for 
an anatomical segregation between D1-expressing ‘Go’ 
(direct; striatomesencephalic) and D2-expressing ‘NoGo’ 
(indirect; striatopallidal) pathways [131, 133–136]. The 
effect of these pathways on occurrent and learned choice 
is consistent with the observations about the activating 
effect of dopamine [137], as we discuss in more detail 
below. Equivalent pathways are typically assumed to exist 
in NAc [138–140] although the segregation here seems 
more debatable [111, 141–143]. Indeed, D1-expressing 
MSNs within NAcC are reported to also project within 
the striatopallidal (‘indirect’) pathway [141, 144]; there 
is evidence for co-expression of D1 and D2 receptors, 
particularly in NAcS [124, 145, 146]; and there are sug-
gestions that D1 and D2 receptors can interact to form 
heteromeric dopamine receptor complexes within the 
same cell [147, 148], though this appears to be still a mat-
ter of question [149]. In functional terms, though, at least 
in the case of appetitive conditioning, it seems there may 
be parallel Go and NoGo routes, given evidence that D1 
receptors may be of particular importance in learning 
Pavlovian contingencies [150–154], while antagonists of 
either D1 or D2 receptors appear to disrupt the expres-
sion of such learning [155–159], including the expression 
of preparatory Pavlovian responses [34, 153]. Unfortu-
nately, given the possible association of core and shell 
with model-free and model-based systems above, experi-
mental evidence that clearly disentangles the roles of D1 
and D2 receptors in these respective areas in appetitive 
conditioning appears to be lacking.
The third detail, which applies equally to ventral and 
dorsal striatum, concerns the link between the activity of 
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dopaminergic cells and the release of dopamine into tar-
get areas. While there is little doubt that phasic release of 
striatal dopamine can be driven by activity in midbrain 
dopaminergic cells (e.g. [160]), a range of mechanisms 
local to the striatum is known to play a role in regulat-
ing dopamine release, including a host of other neuro-
transmitters such as glutamate, acetylcholine, and GABA 
(for recent reviews, see [161, 162]). Indeed, recent evi-
dence suggests that striatal dopamine release can be 
stimulated axo-axonally by the synchronous activity of 
cholinergic interneurons, separate from changes in the 
activity of dopaminergic cells [163]. Furthermore, it has 
long been suggested that there is at least some independ-
ence between fast ‘phasic’ fluctuations in extracellular 
dopamine within the ventral striatum and a relatively 
constant ‘tonic’ dopamine level; the former are proposed 
to be spatially restricted signals driven by phasic bursting 
of dopamine cells, while the latter is thought to be com-
paratively spatially diffuse and controlled rather by the 
number of dopamine cells firing in a slower, ‘tonic’ mode 
of activity [164–166]. Evidence for co-release of other 
neurotransmitters alongside dopamine, such as gluta-
mate and GABA, adds further complexity [98, 100, 167, 
168].
Controlling reward: instrumental conditioning
In the instrumental, model-free, actor-critic method, 
the critic is the Pavlovian predictor, associated with the 
ventral striatum. The actor, by contrast, has been tenta-
tively assigned to the dorsal striatum [78, 80, 169] based 
on its involvement in instrumental learning and control 
[170, 171]. The dorsal striatum is also a target of dopa-
mine neurons, albeit from the substantia nigra pars 
compacta (SNc) rather than the ventral tegmental area 
(VTA). At a slightly finer grain, habitual behaviour has 
been particularly associated with dorsolateral striatum 
[172–175], while goal-directed behaviour has been asso-
ciated with dorsomedial striatum, as well as ventromedial 
prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortices (for recent reviews, 
see [176, 177]). Recent evidence implicates lateral pre-
frontal cortex and frontopolar cortex in the arbitration 
between these two different forms of behavioural control 
in humans [178], and pre- and infra-limbic cortex in rats 
[179].
As noted above, the classical view of dorsal striatum 
is that the projections of largely separate populations 
of D1-expressing (dMSNs) and D2-expressing (iMSNs) 
medium spiny neurons are organised respectively into 
a direct (striatonigral) pathway, which promotes behav-
iour, and an indirect (striatopallidal) pathway, which 
suppresses behaviour [133, 134]. This dichotomous 
expression of D1 and D2 receptors would then allow 
dopamine to modulate the balance between the two 
pathways by differentially regulating excitability and plas-
ticity [131]. In particular, activation of D1 receptors in 
dMSNs increases their excitability and strengthens the 
direct pathway via long-term potentiation (LTP) of excit-
atory synapses. By contrast, activation of D2 receptors in 
iMSNs decreases their excitability and weakens the indi-
rect pathway by promoting long-term depression (LTD) 
of excitatory synapses.
This effect is then the basis of an elegant model-free 
account of instrumental conditioning [137, 180–182]. 
The active selection or inhibition of an action is mediated 
by the balance between direct and indirect pathways. 
Phasic increases and decreases in dopamine concentra-
tion report whether an action results in an outcome that 
is better or worse than expected, either via direct delivery 
of reward, or a favourable change in state. An increase 
consequent on the outcome being better than expected 
strengthens the direct pathway, making it more likely 
that the action will be repeated in the future. By con-
trast, a decrease consequent on the action being worse 
than expected strengthens the indirect pathway, mak-
ing a repeat less likely. Much evidence, including recent 
optogenetic results, appears to support this basic mech-
anism [181, 183], although it is important to note that 
recent results suggest a slightly more nuanced view of 
the simple dichotomy between direct and indirect path-
ways—for instance, they are reported to be coactive dur-
ing action initiation [184], consistent with the idea that 
they form a centre-surround organisation for selecting 
actions [185–187].
While it is natural to associate a dopamine TD predic-
tion error with model-free prediction and control, there 
are hints that this signal shows a sophistication which 
potentially reveals more model-based influences [56, 
188–191]. One such influence is exploration: observa-
tions of phasic activity of dopamine neurons in response 
to novel input which is not rewarding in any obvious 
sense (e.g. a novel auditory stimulus [192]) have been 
considered as an optimism-based exploration bonus 
[193]. It is not clear whether such activations depend, as 
they normatively should, on factors such as reward/pun-
ishment controllability that are typically the preserve of 
model-based calculations. Further, there remains to be 
a clear analysis of the role dopamine plays in the dorso-
medial striatum’s known influence over model-based RL 
[194, 195].
Instrumental vigour
Along with Pavlovian vigour is the possibility of choosing 
the alacrity or force of an action based on the contingent 
effects of this choice. Dopamine has also been implicated 
in this [12], potentially associated with model-based as 
well as model-free actions [196].
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One idea is that there is a coupling between instrumen-
tal vigour and relatively tonic levels of dopamine, in the 
case that the latter report the prevailing average reward 
rate [9, 197]. This quantity acts as an opportunity cost for 
sloth, allowing a need for speed to be balanced against 
the (e.g., energetic) costs of acting quickly. Experiments 
that directly test this idea have duly supported dopamin-
ergic modulation of vigour in reward-based tasks [13, 14, 
16]. Formally, the average rate of TD prediction errors is 
just the same as the average rate of rewards, suggesting 
that nothing more complicated would be necessary to 
implement this effect than averaging phasic fluctuations 
in dopamine, at least in the model-free case. It could then 
be that because phasic fluctuations reflect Pavlovian as 
well as instrumental TD prediction errors, vigour would 
also be influenced by Pavlovian predictions—something 
that is contrary to the original instrumental expecta-
tion [9] but which is apparent in cases such as PIT [95]. 
Tonic dopamine has, of course, been suggested to be 
under somewhat separate control from phasic dopamine 
[164–166].
The putative involvement of dopamine in both vigour 
and valence leads to the prediction of a particular sort 
of hard-wired misbehaviour, or Pavlovian-instrumental 
conflict, namely that it might be hard to learn to withhold 
actions in the face of stimuli that predict rewards if inhi-
bition is successful. This is indeed true, for both animals 
[67] and humans [24].
Defence
The main intent of this review is to understand how 
the elements of adaptive behaviour that we have just 
described apply in the aversive case. Coarsely, we need 
to (i) examine the complexities of consummatory versus 
preparatory, and active versus passive, defensive choices 
in the face of unconditioned aversive stimuli and their 
conditioned predictors; (ii) consider how instrumental 
avoidance actions can be learned to prevent threats from 
arising in the first place; and (iii) consider how the vigour 
of defensive actions is set appropriately.
The reason that we structured this review through 
the medium of dopamine is that it seems that many of 
the same dopaminergic mechanisms that we have just 
described for appetitive conditioning also operate in the 
aversive case, subject to a few added wrinkles. This makes 
for puzzles, both for aversion (how one could get vigor-
ous defensive actions when only potential punishments 
are present and the reward rate is therefore at best nega-
tive) and for dopamine (why dopamine would apparently 
be released in just such purely aversive circumstances).
We argue that it is possible to generalize to these cases 
an expanded notion of safety (cf. [64]), which itself under-
pins the popular, two-factor solution to instrumental 
avoidance [17, 19–22, 198–201]. Amongst other things, 
this implies subtleties in the semantics of dopamine, 
and a need to pay attention to the distinctions between 
reinforcement versus reward, and better versus good. To 
anticipate, we suggest that evidence for positive phasic 
and tonic dopamine responses to aversive unconditioned 
and conditioned stimuli may be explained in terms of a 
prediction of possible future safety. Furthermore, we sug-
gest that these dopamine responses, and the consequent 
stimulation of striatal D2 receptors in particular, play an 
important role in promoting, or at least licensing, active 
defensive behaviours.
Aversive unconditioned stimuli
There is some complexity in the consummatory response 
to an appetitive unconditioned stimulus (US) depending 
on how it needs to be handled. However, the response 
elicited by an aversive US—notably fleeing, freezing, 
or fighting—appears to depend in a richer way on the 
nature of the perceived threat, and indeed the species 
of the animal threatened [27]. Different emphases on 
the nature of the threat, or ‘stressor’, and the defensive 
response, or ‘coping strategy’, have led to subtly different, 
yet complementary, analyses of defensive behaviour and 
its neural substrates, which include the amygdala, ventral 
hippocampus, medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), ventro-
medial hypothalamus, and periaqueductal gray (PAG) 
[25, 26, 28, 202–208] (for a recent review, see [29]).
For our purposes, the most important distinction is 
between active defensive responses, such as fight, flight, 
or freeze, and passive ones, such as quiescence, immo-
bility, or decreased responsiveness. These need to be 
engaged in different circumstances, subject particu-
larly to whether or not the stressor is perceived as being 
escapable or controllable [25]. Thus, active responses are 
adaptive if the stressor is perceived as escapable, since 
these may cause the stressor to be entirely removed. 
Conversely, passive responses may be more adaptive in 
the face of inescapable stress, promoting conservation 
of resources over the longer term and potential recov-
ery once the stressor is removed. In other words, active 
responses entail engagement with the environment, while 
passive responses entail a degree of disengagement from 
the environment [25]. Even freezing involves ‘attentive 
immobility’, which can be interpreted as a state of high 
‘internal’ engagement in threat monitoring.
The potential link to dopamine here is the proposal, 
particularly advocated by Cabib and Puglisi-Allegra 
[209–211] and fleshed out below, that an increased tonic 
level of dopamine in NAc, and especially the resulting 
stimulation of dopamine D2 receptors in this area, pro-
motes active defence, whereas a decreased tonic level 
of dopamine in NAc, and the resulting decrease in D2 
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stimulation, promotes passive defence. This suggestion 
has clear parallels in the appetitive case. As there, in addi-
tion to the canonical direct and indirect pathways, typi-
cally associated with dorsal striatum and the expression 
of instrumental behaviours via disinhibition of cortically-
specified actions [133, 137, 185, 212], we should expect 
accumbens-related Pavlovian defence to involve disinhi-
bition and release of innate behavioural systems organ-
ised at the subcortical level, such as in the hypothalamus 
and PAG [112, 204, 213, 214].
For dopamine release, studies using microdialysis to 
measure extracellular concentrations of dopamine have 
reported elevated levels in response to an aversive US 
in NAc [215, 216], as well as in PFC [217] and amygdala 
[218, 219]. Using the higher temporal resolution tech-
nique of fast-scan cyclic voltammetry (FSCV), it has been 
reported that an aversive tail pinch US immediately trig-
gers elevated dopamine release in the NAcC which is 
time-locked to the duration of the stimulus, while in the 
NAcS dopamine release is predominantly inhibited dur-
ing the stimulus and either recovers or exceeds baseline 
levels following US offset [220, 221].
The substrate for this release is less clear. As we noted, 
many dopamine neurons appear to be activated by unex-
pectedly appetitive events. Although most studies report 
that dopamine neurons are inhibited by an aversive US 
(e.g., an electric shock, tail pinch, or airpuff), there are 
long-standing reports suggesting that a relatively small 
proportion may instead be activated [40]. The dopamin-
ergic nature of some such responses appears to have been 
confirmed more recently via optogenetics [222] and jux-
tacellular labelling [223]. It has also been suggested that 
a particular group of ventrally-located dopamine cells in 
the VTA that projects to mPFC [224, 225] is more uni-
formly excited by aversive USs [223, 226]. In the SNc, it 
has recently been reported that dopamine cells projecting 
to the dorsomedial striatum show immediate suppression 
of activity, followed by sustained elevation of activity, in 
response to a brief electrical shock. By contrast, dopa-
mine cells projecting to dorsolateral striatum display an 
immediate increase in activity before promptly returning 
to baseline [227].
In relation to defensive behaviour, pharmacological 
interventions and lesion studies have long suggested that 
dopamine plays a role (reviews include [12, 34]). More 
recent evidence supporting a particular role for NAc D2 
receptors in defence comes from a series of experiments 
exploiting the ability of local disruptions to glutamate 
signalling in NAcS to elicit motivated behaviours [228, 
229]. Thus, Richard and Berridge [230] have shown that 
expression of certain active defensive behaviours in rats 
(escape attempts, defensive treading/burying), which can 
be elicited by local AMPA blockade caudally in medial 
NAcS, not only requires endogenous dopamine activ-
ity [115], but also intact signalling of both D1 and D2 
receptors. By contrast, (appetitive) feeding behaviour, 
elicited by glutamate disruption more rostrally in the 
medial NAcS, only requires intact signalling of D1 recep-
tors [230]. This result supports a role for D1 receptors in 
active defence—as well as particular subregions of NAcS 
(though see [231] for evidence that the behaviours elic-
ited from these regions is sensitive to context)—but it 
also seems to indicate an asymmetry in the involvement 
of D2 receptors in modulating the expression of innate 
appetitive versus defensive behaviours.
Other studies also suggest a role for D2 stimulation 
in active defence, though do not necessarily trace this to 
NAcS. For example, the expression of certain defensive 
behaviours in cats (ear retraction, growling, hissing, and 
paw striking), elicitable by electrical stimulation in ventro-
medial hypothalamus, can also be respectively instigated 
or blocked by direct microinjection into that area of a D2 
agonist or antagonist [232, 233]. Indeed, as mentioned 
previously, anatomical connections between NAcS and 
hypothalamus are known to play an important role in con-
trolling motivated behaviours, with NAcS cast in the role 
of ‘sentinel’ allowing disinhibition of appropriate behav-
ioural centres located in the hypothalamus [112, 214].
Such lines of evidence are consistent with promotion of 
active Pavlovian defences via enhanced dopamine release 
and increased NAc D2 stimulation. Evidence for the other 
side of the proposal—promotion of passive Pavlovian 
defences via a drop in dopamine release and reduced NAc 
D2 stimulation—is provided by experiments in which 
animals are exposed to chronic (i.e. inescapable) aversive 
stimuli, such as in animal models of depression [234]. 
Briefly, not only do animals in these settings show dimin-
ished expression of active defensive behaviours such 
as escape attempts over time [235–237], but it has also 
been observed that an initial increase in NAc tonic dopa-
mine on first exposure to the stressor gradually gives way 
to reduced, below baseline, dopamine levels [238–241]. 
Since modifications of the animal’s behaviour over time 
in such cases are presumably driven by experience of the 
(unsuccessful) outcomes of its escape attempts, and so 
more naturally fit with an instrumental analysis, we post-
pone fuller discussion of these results until considering 
the issue of instrumental behaviour and controllability 
below. However, we note that these changes in patterns 
of defence and dopamine release over time potentially 
yield an interesting case of a model-based influence on 
dopamine and perhaps model-free behaviours.
Pain research provides a complementary view. Bolles 
and Fanselow [205] pointed out that efficacious (active) 
defence requires inhibition of pain-related behav-
iours oriented towards healing injuries. Thus, it was 
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hypothesized that activation of a fear motivation system, 
which promotes defensive behaviours (i.e. fight, flight, 
or freeze), inhibits—for example, by release of endog-
enous analgesics—a pain motivation system, which pro-
motes recuperative behaviours (i.e. resting and body-care 
responses). Similarly, activation of the pain system was 
hypothesized to inhibit the fear system since (active) 
defensive behaviours would interfere with recovery via 
(passive) recuperative behaviours. In this light, it is inter-
esting to note the well-established link between NAc 
dopamine, and D2 stimulation in particular, and analgesia 
[242, 243]. Conversely, reductions in motivation in mouse 
models of chronic pain—consistent with energy-preserv-
ing, recuperative functions—have recently been shown 
to depend on adaptation of (D2-expressing) iMSNs in 
NAc [244], and that this adaptation includes an increase 
in excitability of iMSNs in medial NAcS [245]. In turn, 
these results are consistent with previous observations of 
reduced effortful behaviour caused by blockade of NAc 
D2 receptors [246, 247]. Both observations are consist-
ent with reductions of actions involved in active defence 
being caused by the relative strengthening of a ventral 
indirect pathway.
While these various lines of evidence point to involve-
ment of accumbens dopamine, and NAc D2 signalling in 
particular, in modulating defence, we note some impor-
tant caveats. As mentioned earlier, the separation of 
direct and indirect pathways in the accumbens is subject 
to continuing debate, with evidence that D1-expressing 
MSNs in NAc also project within the canonical indi-
rect pathway [141] and that a substantial proportion of 
NAc MSNs co-express D1 and D2 receptors [124]. Fur-
thermore, while D2 receptors may be more attuned to 
changes in tonic dopamine levels by virtue of their higher 
affinity, such changes presumably affect occupancy at 
both D1 and D2 receptors dependent on their affini-
ties [130]. In short, rather than completely separate D1 
and D2 systems that can be independently switched on 
and off, the true situation is likely to be more complex. 
Furthermore, experiments involving dopamine recep-
tor agonists and antagonists can be difficult to interpret, 
since they may involve certain side-effects—such as the 
well known extrapyramidal symptoms associated with D2 
antagonists [248]—and placing the system into states not 
encountered during normal functioning.
From an RL perspective, the roles of dopamine and D2 
receptors raise two salient issues. The first is how to make 
sense of the apparent asymmetry in the involvement 
of D2 receptors in defensive, as opposed to appetitive, 
behaviours. One possibility starts from the observation 
that traditional paradigms assessing the interaction of 
Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning suggest that the 
Pavlovian defence system is biased towards behavioural 
inhibition in the face of threat [249, 250]. This Pavlovian 
bias may potentially require relatively greater inhibi-
tion of the ventral indirect pathway in order to disinhibit 
active defensive responses when required. Of course, 
this mechanistic speculation merely poses the further 
question of why the Pavlovian defence system should be 
biased towards behavioural inhibition in the first place. 
One dubitable speculation is that this stems from asym-
metries in the statistics of rewards and punishments in 
the environment [251]. However, more work is necessary 
on this point.
The second, and more fundamental, issue is how to 
interpret variation, particularly enhancement, of NAc 
dopamine release in response to an aversive US in the 
first place, given the apparent tie between dopamine, 
appetitive prediction errors, and reward rates. This is 
the extended version of the puzzle of active avoidance to 
which we referred at the beginning. To answer this, we 
first consider certain similarities and differences between 
the unexpected arrival of an appetitive or aversive US 
[252]. This requires us to be more (apparently pedanti-
cally) precise about the appetitive case than previously. 
Here, the unpredicted arrival of the appetitive US (e.g. 
food) represents an unexpected improvement in the ani-
mal’s situation. This improvement stems from the fact 
that the US predicts that an outcome of positive value is 
immediately attainable. Indeed, all USs can be thought of 
as predictors, where these predictions are not learned but 
rather hard-wired. Thus, as previously noted, an appeti-
tive US will engage innate behaviours such as salivation 
and approach. In turn, these unconditioned responses 
can be interpreted as reflecting at least an implicit 
expectation that the predicted reward is attainable/
controllable, or at least potentially so, subject to further 
exploration. Thus, salivation in response to the presence 
of a food US can be interpreted as reflecting a tacit belief 
that the food will be consumable (and both require and 
benefit from ingestion). As reviewed above, the phasic 
responses of dopamine cells in response to the unex-
pected presentation of an appetitive US, along with other 
observations, encourage a TD interpretation in terms of 
a response to an unexpected predictor of future reward.
Consider now the arrival of an unexpected aversive US 
(e.g. the sight of a predator). What this event signifies 
seems more complex. On the one hand, this surprising 
event presumably indicates that the present situation is 
worse than originally expected, since the animal is now in 
an undesirable state of danger: i.e., (a) the aversive US is 
an ‘unpredicted predictor of possible future punishment’. 
As such, we should expect a negative prediction error. 
Indeed, at least the net value of the prediction error had 
better be negative to avoid misassignment of positive val-
ues to dangerous states and the consequent development 
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of masochistic tendencies (i.e., the active seeking out of 
such dangerous states). On the other hand, relative to 
this new state of danger, the possible prospect of future 
safety—a positive outcome—comes into play. That is, at 
the point that the animal would actually manage to elimi-
nate the threat if it can do so, the change in state from 
danger to safety would lead to an appetitive prediction 
error—just as with the change in state associated with 
the unexpected observation of food. Thus, provided the 
animal has the expectation that it will ultimately be able 
to achieve safety, i.e., that the situation is controllable, 
observation of the aversive stimulus should predict this 
future appetitive outcome, and so (b) lead to an imme-
diate appetitive prediction error. The challenge therefore 
seems to be that of reconciling (a) and (b), i.e., the role of 
the aversive US as unpredicted predictor of both danger 
and possible future safety. To avoid any confusion, note 
that we discuss learning processes associated with signal-
ling safety below; here, we consider hard-wired assess-
ments of the absence of danger.
One attractive reconciliation comes from appealing to 
the concept of opponency [59, 253, 254]. Here, an aversive 
process would ensure that the net TD error caused by the 
unexpected aversive US is negative and that dangerous 
states are correctly assigned negative value. At the same 
time, an appetitive process would motivate behaviour 
towards the comparatively benign state of safety. Indeed, 
it has previously been proposed that the net prediction 
error can be decomposed in exactly this way [255], with 
the phasic activity of dopamine neurons signalling the 
appetitive component of this signal, while the aversive 
component is signalled by other means (e.g. by phasic 
serotonergic activity [23, 249, 252, 256]), such that the 
net prediction error would actually be negative [252].
A further consideration is the value of exploration. 
In appetitive contexts, we noted that exploration can be 
motivated by bonuses associated with the future value of 
what might be presently discovered. A potential heuristic 
realization of this was through the phasic activity of dopa-
mine neurons inspired by novel stimuli [192, 193]. Con-
sider the extension of this logic to the unexpected arrival 
of an aversive US: the animal may have the pragmatic a 
priori belief that safety is controllable, but the unexpected 
(and therefore ‘novel’) arrival of an aversive US may never-
theless be attended by uncertainty about how this new sit-
uation should be controlled. The issue of how exploration 
may then be carried out in a benign manner is of course 
particularly salient here (for a recent view of the issue of 
safe exploration from the RL perspective, see, e.g. [257]). 
The idea that a novel stressor elicits exploration in the 
‘search for effective active coping’ has also been suggested 
by Cabib and Puglisi-Allegra [211]. In their scheme, a 
novel stressor leads to release of noradrenaline in PFC 
and dopamine in NAc; both of these are hypothesized to 
contribute to an active coping response by encouraging 
exploration (noradrenaline in PFC) and active removal 
of the stressor (stimulation of D2 receptors in NAc). Of 
particular note is that insufficient exploration can lead to 
persistent miscalibration [258]. That is, if the subject fails 
to explore, for instance because it believes the aversive 
stimulus to be insufficiently controllable, then it would 
never discover that it actually might be removed. Such a 
belief could result from a computational-level calculation 
about generalization from prior experience (as in learned 
helplessness; [31, 32]). At a different level of explanation, 
insufficient stimulation of D2 receptors, leading to a lack 
of inhibition of passive defensive mechanisms, could 
readily have the same consequence.
Relevant to the issue of exploration and dopamine’s 
possible involvement is the topic of anxiety. Fear and 
anxiety can be differentiated both by the behaviours they 
characteristically involve and their sensitivity to phar-
macological challenge [259, 260]. Experimental assays 
of anxiety typically involve pitting the motivation to 
approach/explore novel situations against the motivation 
to avoid potential hazards [261]. According to one influ-
ential theory, it is exactly the function of anxiety in such 
cases of approach-avoidance conflict to move the animal 
towards potential danger, the better to assess risk [26, 
259]. Not only is this thought to involve suppression of 
incompatible defensive responses, but also stimulation of 
approach; the associated ‘behavioural approach system’ 
is associated with NAc and its modulation by dopamine 
[259]. It would be interesting to consider a recent Bayes-
ian decision-theoretic view of anxiety [262] that focuses 
on the opposite aspect, namely behavioural inhibition 
when there is no information to be gathered, and con-
sider potential anti-correlations with dopaminergic mod-
ulation of the NAc.
In addition to evidence that some dopamine cells show 
phasic excitation in response to an aversive US, we also 
noted evidence from microdialysis studies for enhanced 
dopamine release in response to an aversive US over 
longer periods of time. What is the aversive parallel of 
the suggestion in the appetitive case that tonic dopamine 
levels, particularly in NAc, reflect an average reward rate 
which realizes the opportunity cost for acting slowly [9]? 
In aversive situations, the average reward rate is never 
strictly positive but, at least intuitively, time spent not 
actively engaged in a course of appropriate defensive 
action could be very costly indeed. For example, if an 
animal has just detected the presence of a predator, time 
spent not engaged in a course of defensive action could 
cost the potential safety that has thereby been missed.
Such considerations indicate the incompleteness of this 
previous account of tonic dopamine levels. In particular, 
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dovetailing with our suggestions regarding phasic dopa-
mine above, the suggested mapping of tonic dopamine 
to the average rate of reward needs to be broadened to 
include the potentially-achievable rate of safety [252] 
which, assuming a prior expectation of controllabil-
ity, will be positive. This provides a possible explanation 
for why increased tonic dopamine concentrations have 
been observed in microdialysis studies in response to 
an aversive US. However, if the aversive US is inescap-
able or uncontrollable, then the potentially-achievable 
rate of safety reduces to nothing. Thus, the tonic release 
of dopamine would also be expected to decrease. This is 
consistent with evidence already mentioned that the ini-
tial increase in tonic NAc dopamine level dissipates over 
time, giving way to an eventual fall below baseline levels 
[238–241].
Pavlovian conditioned defence
In relation to conditioning in aversive settings, similar 
complexities arise due to the fact that learning is likely to 
result in both aversive (i.e. danger-predicting) and appe-
titive (i.e. safety-predicting) conditioned stimuli, and may 
promote passive or active defensive strategies. Again, we 
use dopamine as a medium through which to view these 
complexities, with its preferential attachment to single 
sides of these dichotomies.
Fear conditioning
Conditioning in the aversive case, where animals are 
exposed to cues predictive of aversive outcomes, is gen-
erally known as fear conditioning due to the constellation 
of physiological and behavioural responses that the aver-
sive CS comes to evoke. As in the appetitive case, con-
ditioned and unconditioned responses need not be the 
same. Take, for instance, the case of conditioning a rat to 
a footshock US [263]. Here, the predominant response 
of the rat on exposure to the environment where it has 
received footshocks in the past, i.e. the CR, is to freeze. 
By contrast, the immediate response elicited by the 
shock itself, i.e. the UR, is a vigorous burst of activity. 
Furthermore, there can be model-based, outcome-spe-
cific, predictions allowing tailored responses (e.g., [264]) 
as well as model-free, outcome-general, predictions 
leading to generic preparatory responses such as behav-
ioural inhibition.
The intricacies of how CR and UR relate to each other, 
which are arguably greater in the case of fear condition-
ing where these may be in conflict, may explain some 
of the difficulties in explicating dopamine’s role in fear 
conditioning. A role for dopamine in fear conditioning 
seems to be generally accepted, though there is less con-
sensus on the exact nature of this role (reviews include 
[265–267]).
Electrophysiological studies report that a substantial 
fraction (35–65  %) of putative dopamine neurons are 
activated by an aversive CS which is interleaved with an 
appetitive CS, a fraction that even exceeds the frequency 
(<15 %) of activations in response to an aversive US [191]. 
However, it has been suggested that many, though not all, 
of these activations may reflect ‘false aversive responses’, 
arising principally from generalization from appetitive to 
aversive CSs of the same sensory modality [191]. Addi-
tionally, an aversive CS may allow the animal to reduce 
the impact of an aversive US or avoid it entirely, and so 
in effect act as an instrumental ‘safety signal’, predicting 
a relatively benign outcome given a suitable defensive 
strategy. For example, a CS which predicts an aversive 
airpuff may facilitate a well-timed blink, thereby reduc-
ing the airpuff’s aversiveness [268]. This fits with the idea, 
mentioned above, that dopaminergic responses may be 
instigated by predicted safety, or a relative improvement 
in expected state of affairs.
Regardless of the interpretation of such activations 
of dopamine cells by aversive CSs, this activity appears 
to play a role in fear conditioning. For example, Zweifel 
et  al. [269] have recently shown that disruption of pha-
sic bursting by dopamine neurons via inactivation of 
their NMDA receptors impairs fear conditioning in mice. 
These mice apparently develop a ‘generalized anxiety-like 
phenotype’, which the authors ascribe to the animals’ fail-
ure to learn the correct contingencies.
Similar to observations in microdialysis studies of 
an increase in NAcS dopamine following an aversive 
US, enhanced NAcS dopamine release is also observed 
following presentation of an aversive CS [216]. Such 
enhanced release in NAcS to the onset of an aversive CS 
is corroborated by a recent FSCV study [270], though 
the opposite effect—decreased release—was observed in 
NAcC. Another recent FSCV study suggests that whether 
an increase or decrease in NAcC dopamine release is 
observed following an aversive CS depends critically 
on the animal’s ability to avoid the predicted US [271]. 
Thus, Oleson et  al. [271] found that, when trained in a 
fear conditioning paradigm—where the aversive US (a 
shock) was necessarily inescapable—presentation of the 
CS led to a decrease in NAcC dopamine. By contrast, in 
a conditioned avoidance paradigm—where the animal 
could potentially avoid the shock—both decreases and 
increases in NAcC dopamine were observed: an increase 
on trials in which animals successfully avoided shock, 
but a decrease on trials in which animals failed to avoid 
shock.
Dopamine receptor subtypes appear to play distinct 
roles. There is some consensus that D1 receptor agonists 
and antagonists respectively promote or impede learn-
ing and expression in fear conditioning paradigms, while 
Page 11 of 23Lloyd and Dayan  Behav Brain Funct  (2016) 12:15 
the effect of D2 manipulations is less clear [265, 267]. 
One study found that fear-potentiated startle could be 
restored in dopamine-deficient mice by administration 
of L-Dopa immediately following fear conditioning, but 
required intact signalling of D1 receptors but not of D2 
receptors (although other members of the D2-like family 
of receptors were reportedly required; [272]). Consist-
ent with this finding, it has been reported recently that 
striatal-specific D1 receptor knock-out mice, but not stri-
atal-specific D2 receptor knock-out mice, exhibit strongly 
impaired contextual fear conditioning [273]. Combined 
with evidence from previous fear conditioning studies 
[267, 274–277], as well as extensive evidence from the 
conditioned avoidance literature (see below), it appears 
that D2 receptor manipulations affect only the expression 
of conditioned fear, rather than the learning of the associ-
ation between aversive CS and US. This is consistent with 
experimental results in appetitive Pavlovian conditioning 
reviewed above, which suggest that D1 receptors are par-
ticularly important in learning the CS-US contingency, 
while both D1 and D2 receptors are involved in modu-
lating expression of this learning. Further, it has been 
reported recently that disruption of dopamine signalling 
in NAcC, but not NAcS, attenuated the ability of an aver-
sive CS to block secondary conditioning of an additional 
CS, suggesting differential involvement of these areas 
[278].
Safety conditioning
The situation in which a CS predicts the absence of a US 
is usually known as ‘conditioned inhibition’ [279, 280]. In 
the particular case where the predicted absence is of an 
aversive US, the CS is called a safety signal [281, 282]. In 
considering aversive USs, we previously discussed hard-
wired signals for safety—i.e., the absence of danger or 
threat. By contrast, here we consider previously neutral 
stimuli whose semantic association with safety is learned.
Such safety signals are capable of inhibiting fear 
and stress responses, and are known to have reward-
ing properties. For example, safety signals have been 
shown to act as conditioned reinforcers of instrumen-
tal responses [283]. This is consistent with the proposal 
of Konorski [59] and subsequent authors [199, 284, 285] 
that aversive and appetitive motivation systems recipro-
cally inhibit each other. The idea is that inhibition of the 
aversive system by a safety signal leads to disinhibition of 
the appetitive system, and so a safety signal is function-
ally equivalent to a CS that directly excites the appetitive 
system.
Neuroscientific study of safety signals is, however, at a 
relatively early stage (for reviews, see [281, 282]). Stud-
ies have identified neural correlates of learned safety 
in the amygdala [286–288] and striatum [286, 289]. 
Involvement of dopamine within NAcS in mediating 
the ability of the safety signal to inhibit fear, and conse-
quently its ability to act as a conditioned reinforcer, is 
suggested by a recent study [290]. In particular, it was 
found that both infusion of d-amphetamine, an indirect 
dopamine agonist, and blockade of D1/D2 receptors in 
NAcS—but not in NAcC—disrupted the fear-inhibiting 
properties of a safety signal. While this finding implicates 
a role of NAcS in mediating the impact of the safety sig-
nal, why these manipulations had similar, as opposed to 
contrasting, effects is not clear.
Instrumental defence: learning to avoid
The final form of learning we consider in detail is instru-
mental avoidance. This is a rich paradigm that involves 
many of the behaviours and learning processes that we 
have discussed so far: innate defence mechanisms, fear 
conditioning, safety conditioning, and instrumental 
learning (cf. [291]). Furthermore, a role of dopamine in 
active avoidance, and D2 receptors in particular, has long 
been suggested by the fact that dopamine antagonists 
interfere with avoidance learning [34, 292]. Indeed, such 
interference led to this paradigm being used to screen 
dopamine antagonists for antipsychotic activity [10, 12, 
248]. Finally, the two-factor theory of active avoidance 
[17, 200, 201] that we discuss below was actually the gen-
esis of the explanation we have been giving for the ready 
engagement of dopamine in the case of aversion.
The problem of avoidance and two‑factor theory
A typical avoidance learning experiment involves plac-
ing an animal (e.g., a rat) in an environment in which a 
warning signal (e.g., a tone) predicts future experience of 
an aversive US (e.g., a shock) unless the animal performs 
a timely instrumental avoidance response (e.g., shuttling 
to a different location, or pressing a lever). That animals 
successfully learn to avoid under such conditions posed 
a problem that concerned early learning theorists [18]: 
how can the nonoccurrence of an aversive event—a ubiq-
uitous condition—act as a behavioural reinforcer?
A solution to this ‘problem of avoidance’ has long been 
suggested in the form of a two-factor theory [17, 59, 200, 
293–296]. The name ‘two-factor’ refers to the hypoth-
esis that two behavioural factors or processes—Pavlo-
vian and instrumental—are involved in the acquisition of 
conditioned avoidance. Firstly, the warning signal comes 
to elicit a state of fear through its predictive relationship 
with the aversive US. Thus, the first factor of the theory 
refers to the Pavlovian process of fear conditioning. This 
Pavlovian process then allows the second factor to come 
into play: if the animal now produces an action leading to 
the cessation of the warning stimulus, the animal enters a 
state of relief, or reduced fear, capable of reinforcing the 
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avoidance response. Thus, the second factor refers to an 
instrumental process by which the avoidance response 
is reinforced through fear reduction or relief. Such an 
account can also include stimuli dependent on the avoid-
ance response and which are anticorrelated with the aver-
sive US, thereby becoming predictive of safety [201]. As 
discussed, these safety signals (SS) themselves are thought 
to be capable of inhibiting conditioned fear [280], thereby 
both preventing Pavlovian fear responses (e.g., freezing) 
which may interfere with the instrumental avoidance 
response and reinforcing safety-seeking behaviours in 
fearful states or environments [294, 296], consistent with 
theories of opponent motivational processes [59, 285].
Avoidance, innate defence, and controllability
As mentioned above, the importance of innate defensive 
behaviours in the avoidance context has long been noted. 
Bolles [27], highlighting the importance of such ‘spe-
cies-specific defense reactions’, argued that if an avoid-
ance behaviour is rapidly acquired, this is because the 
required avoidance response coincides with the expres-
sion of an innate defensive response by the animal, rather 
than reflecting a learning process; how difficult the ani-
mal finds the avoidance task will depend on the extent 
to which the avoidance response is compatible with its 
innate defensive repertoire. In turn, which innate behav-
iour the animal selects will be sensitive to relevant fea-
tures of the avoidance situation, such as whether there 
is a visible escape route or not, reminiscent of Tolman’s 
[297] notion of behavioural support stimuli [206, 298].
Just as in the appetitive case, conflict between such 
Pavlovian behaviours and instrumental contingencies can 
lead to apparently maladaptive behaviour, albeit in rather 
unnatural experimental settings. Thus, Seymour et  al. 
[299] highlight experiments in which self-punitive behav-
iour arises when an animal is (instrumentally) punished 
for emitting Pavlovian responses in response to that pun-
ishment. In one such unfortunate case, squirrel mon-
keys were apparently unable to decrease the frequency 
of painful shocks delivered to them by suppressing their 
shock-induced tendency to pull at a restraining leash 
attached to their collar; pulling on the restraining leash 
was exactly the action that hastened arrival of the next 
shock [300].
Similarly, just as it has been suggested that the ani-
mal’s appraisal of whether a threat is escapable or not is 
crucial in determining its defensive strategy in general 
(e.g., [25]), it was famously shown that the controllabil-
ity of an aversive US is crucial in determining subsequent 
avoidance learning performance [301, 302]. In particular, 
dogs exposed to inescapable shocks in a first environ-
ment showed deficits in initiating avoidance or escape 
responses in a second environment, even though the 
aversive US was now escapable. This, of course, led to 
the concept of ‘learned helplessness’ [237]. Huys and 
Dayan [32] presented a model-based account of learned 
helplessness, arguing that the generalization between 
environments affected the value of exploration, thereby 
leading to persistent miscalibration.
The issue of model-free versus model-based influences 
has received rather less attention in aversive than appeti-
tive contexts. However, sensitivity to revaluation of aver-
sive USs in the context of instrumental avoidance has 
been demonstrated in rats [303, 304] and humans [305, 
306], indicating model-based influences under at least 
some avoidance conditions. Fernando et  al. [303] have 
recently reported that revaluation of a shock US induced 
by pairing shock with systemic analgesics (morphine or 
D-amphetamine), leading rats subsequently to decrease 
their rate of avoidance responding, could also be 
achieved by pairing the shock with more selective infu-
sions of a mu-opioid agonist into either NAcS or PAG. 
Involvement of NAcS and related structures in revalua-
tion in this instance is consistent with the idea that the 
shell is involved in model-based prediction [56].
Dopamine, D2 receptors, and active avoidance
Two-factor theories of avoidance fit well with the idea 
that the striatum, in interaction with dopamine, imple-
ments an actor-critic algorithm [21, 22, 78, 80, 169, 307]. 
Thus, an initial period of learning by the critic (in the 
ventral striatum) of negative state values (i.e., fear con-
ditioning) allows subsequent instrumental training of an 
avoidance response by the actor (in the dorsal striatum), 
since actions leading to the unexpected non-delivery of 
the aversive US are met with a positive prediction error 
(‘better than expected’), as signalled by dopamine neu-
rons in the midbrain.
It was the abilities of certain antipsychotic drugs and 
neurotoxic lesions to produce active avoidance learn-
ing deficits [248, 292] that suggested a critical role for 
dopamine in the acquisition of conditioned avoidance. 
Furthermore, localised neurotoxic lesions suggested that 
dopamine projections to both dorsal and ventral striatum 
were required for acquisition of active avoidance [308, 
309], corroborated by more recent work on selective res-
toration of dopamine signalling in dopamine-deficient 
mice [310]. This is consistent with complementary roles 
of actor (ventral striatum) and critic (dorsal striatum) in 
adapting behaviour.
Dopamine’s action on D2 receptors appears of particu-
lar importance for this. Evidence from active avoidance 
studies suggests that while blocking D2 receptors leaves 
fear conditioning intact, instrumental learning of the 
avoidance response requires intact D2 signalling [292, 
311, 312]. From the perspective of the actor-critic, one 
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might conclude that blockade of D2 receptors therefore 
does not interfere with the learning of negative state 
values by the critic but does interfere with the learning 
of the actor [22]. The finding that D2 receptor blockade 
leaves conditioning to aversive stimuli intact in the active 
avoidance setting is consistent with evidence from fear 
conditioning studies (see above). Furthermore, that D2 
blockade also disrupts instrumental learning is consistent 
with dopamine’s modulation of direct and indirect path-
ways in the dorsal striatum, as in Frank’s [137] model, 
since this would be expected to lead to a relative strength-
ening of the indirect, ‘NoGo’ pathway and impede acqui-
sition of the appropriate ‘Go’ response (albeit leaving this 
model without a means of implementing the preserved 
fear conditioning). However, this would raise the ques-
tion of why D2 receptors within dorsal striatum should 
be implicated more strongly in learning than are those 
in ventral striatum. A pertinent observation might be a 
distinction between the longevity of the effects of tying 
optogenetic stimulation of (D1-expressing) dMSNs and 
(D2-expressing) iMSNs in the dorsomedial striatum 
[183] of mice. These authors triggered activation of one 
or other pathway when the mouse made contact with 
one of two touch sensors. dMSN stimulation increased 
preference for its associated lever, whereas iMSN stimu-
lation decreased it. However, whereas the positive prefer-
ence persisted in extinction throughout a test period, the 
negative preference rapidly disappeared. Furthermore, it 
was noted that stimulation of iMSNs elicited brief, imme-
diate freezing followed by an ‘escape response’, though 
these behavioural changes were not thought sufficient to 
explain the bias away from the laser-paired trigger.
Nevertheless, while many findings accord well with an 
actor-critic account of avoidance learning, there are at 
least two omissions in such accounts that require correc-
tion. Firstly, similar to Bolles’ complaints about two-fac-
tor theory, actor-critic accounts have largely ignored the 
role for innate (i.e., Pavlovian) defence mechanisms. Sec-
ondly, the key factor of controllability has not been fully 
integrated with actor-critic models.
Indeed, disruption of innate defensive behaviour by 
D2 blockade occurs as well as disruption of instrumental 
learning of the active avoidance response. There are sug-
gestions that suppression of conditioned avoidance may 
rely more on disruption of D2 signalling within ventral, 
rather than dorsal, striatum [248], consistent with inter-
ference with Pavlovian (‘critic’) rather than instrumental 
(‘actor’) processes. For example, post-training injection 
of a D2 antagonist into NAcS, but not into dorsolateral 
striatum, leads to a relatively immediate suppression of a 
conditioned avoidance response [313]. As we saw above, 
NAcS, under dopaminergic modulation, is implicated in 
controlling expression of innate defensive behaviours, 
and D2 activation appears to promote active defensive 
strategies. Similarly, there is evidence that D2 blockade 
leads to enhanced freezing responses—arguably, a more 
passive form of defence—following footshock, interfering 
with rats’ ability to emit avoidance responses [34, 274], 
though there remains some doubt about whether fear-
induced freezing is an important factor in the disruption 
of conditioned avoidance [248]. In their review of the role 
of dopamine in avoidance learning, and defence more 
generally, Blackburn and colleagues [34] suggest that D2 
blockade does not disrupt defensive behaviour globally 
but rather ‘changes the probability that a given class of 
defensive response will be selected’ ([34], p. 267), in par-
ticular increasing the probability of freezing.
In relation to controllability, we have already referred 
to evidence that exposure to chronic, inescapable stress 
abolishes stress-induced increases in the concentra-
tion of accumbens dopamine [238–241]. Such evidence 
has led Cabib and Puglisi-Allegra [209–211] to sug-
gest that whether an increase or decrease in accum-
bens dopamine levels is observed in response to stress 
depends on whether the stressor is appraised as control-
lable (increase) or not (decrease). This dissipation of the 
dopamine response does not appear to be explained by 
dopamine depletion, since subsequent release from the 
chronic stressor leads to a large, rapid increase in dopa-
mine concentration [239]. Similarly, Cabib and Puglisi-
Allegra [209], using a yoked paradigm in which one of a 
pair of animals (the ‘master’) has some control over the 
amount of shock experienced by means of an escape 
response while the other (‘yoked’) animal does not, found 
evidence consistent with elevated and inhibited NAc 
dopamine in master and yoked animals, respectively, 
after an hour of shock exposure.
More recently, Tye et  al. [314] used optogenetics to 
assess the effects of exciting or inhibiting identified 
VTA dopamine cells in certain rodent models of depres-
sion involving inescapable stressors (tail suspension, 
forced swim, and chronic mild stress paradigms). While 
optogenetic inhibition of these dopamine cells could 
induce behaviour that has been related to depression, 
such as reduced escape attempts, optogenetic activation 
of the same cells was found to rescue depression-like 
phenotypes (e.g., promoting escape-related behaviours) 
induced by chronic stress. Furthermore, it was observed 
that chronic stress led to a reduction in measures of pha-
sic VTA activity. This latter observation contrasts with 
studies using repeated social defeat stress, where phasic 
VTA activity has typically been observed to increase in 
‘susceptible’ animals [315–317]. Apparently contradic-
tory findings regarding stress-induced changes in VTA 
dopamine activity, and indeed the effects of manipulat-
ing this via optogenetic stimulation, might stem from the 
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subtleties of the different paradigms used, but may also 
reflect heterogeneity in the properties of different VTA 
dopamine cells, such as between those projecting to 
mPFC versus NAc (for a recent discussion of these issues, 
see [318]).
While there is evidence from microdialysis studies that 
support a link between controllability, defensive strategy, 
and tonic NAc dopamine, it should be noted that not 
all such evidence points in this direction. For example, 
Bland et  al. [319] measured both dopamine and seroto-
nin release in NAcS of rats in the yoked pairs paradigm 
referred to previously. While they did report a trend for 
increased dopamine release relative to no-shock controls, 
this increase was neither significant nor differed between 
master and yoked animals. By contrast, serotonin levels 
were found to be significantly increased in yoked animals 
during and after stress exposure, relative to master and 
no-shock control animals [319]. Experiments using the 
same paradigm but taking measurements from mPFC 
found elevated levels of both dopamine and serotonin in 
yoked animals compared to master and no-shock con-
trols [320].
These latter studies and others [321–323] highlight that 
consideration of other neuromodulators, notably sero-
tonin, is crucial for a fuller understanding of defensive 
behaviour. A role of serotonin has long been suggested 
both in the particular case of active avoidance [312, 324] 
and in defence more generally [249, 250]. As mentioned, 
one suggestion is that the putative opponency between 
appetitive and aversive motivation systems [59, 254, 285] 
is at least partly implemented in opponency between 
dopamine and serotonin, respectively [23, 249–251, 256]. 
A specific computational model of this idea was sug-
gested by Daw et  al. [255], and Dayan [252] has more 
recently considered such opponency in the particular 
case of active avoidance. However, a modulatory role of 
controllability in the active avoidance setting has not yet 
been fully integrated into RL models.
Conclusions
Here, we have discussed unconditioned/conditioned, 
Pavlovian/instrumental, and passive/active issues associ-
ated with aversion. We used dopamine, and particularly 
its projection into the striatum and the D2 system, as a 
form of canary, since the way that dopamine underpins 
model-free learning, and model-free and model-based 
vigour, turns out to be highly revealing for the organi-
zation of aversive processing. Our essential explanatory 
strategy rested on three concepts: safety, opponency, and 
controllability.
When under threat, safety is a desirable state. We 
suggested that the prospect of possible future safety 
underlies positive dopamine responses—both tonic and 
phasic—in response to aversive stimuli. Indeed, the inter-
pretation of these responses is very similar to the more 
obviously appetitive case involving rewards, since safety 
is an appetitive outcome. Thus, phasic activation of dopa-
mine cells in response to an aversive stimulus can be 
interpreted in TD terms as an ‘unpredicted predictor of 
future safety’. Similarly, increased levels of tonic dopa-
mine in conditions of stress, particularly in NAc, can be 
interpreted as signalling a potentially-achievable rate of 
safety.
Of course, what makes safety a more subtle concept 
is that it is relative; it is defined in opposition to danger. 
Dangerous states are not, in general, good states, which 
is why, in opposition to an appetitive process directed at 
safety in such states, there should be an aversive system 
which signals the disutility of occupying dangerous states. 
Therefore, positive dopamine responses which putatively 
signal the appetitive component of a TD prediction error 
in such states can only be part of the story—an opponent 
signal is required, marking the value of the path that will 
(hopefully) not be taken, and providing a new baseline 
against which to measure outcomes. This results in a 
form of counterfactual learning signal, a quantity that has 
also been investigated in purely appetitive contexts, and 
may have special relevance to the dorsal, rather than the 
ventral, striatum [325–328].
Unfortunately, while the notion of opponent appeti-
tive and aversive processes is long-standing [59, 253, 254, 
285], we still know relatively little about their neural real-
ization. As mentioned, one idea is that this opponency 
maps to dopamine (appetitive) and serotonin (aversive) 
signalling [23, 249–251, 256], and specific computa-
tional models of this idea have been advanced [252, 255]. 
Recent attention to electrophysiological recordings from 
identified serotonergic cells in conditions of reward and 
punishment is particularly welcome in this regard, albeit 
offering no comfort to these theoretical ideas [329], 
and we look forward to further work which leverages 
advances in neuroscientific techniques to clarify the neu-
ral substrate of opponency.
Whether safety is appraised as achievable or not 
appears to be crucial, hence our appeal to the concept 
of controllability. We reviewed evidence that tonic lev-
els of dopamine are modulated downwards over time 
with chronic exposure to aversive stimuli. Further, we 
reviewed evidence that dopamine, and NAc D2-receptor 
stimulation in particular, modulates active versus passive 
defensive strategies (or perhaps better, defensive versus 
recuperative behaviours). Modulation of dopamine in 
this way raises pressing questions about controllability at 
both more and less abstract levels. Indeed, even formal-
izing an adequate concept of behavioural control in the 
first instance is nontrivial [32].
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The concept of controllability brings model-based and 
model-free considerations back into focus since, at least 
intuitively, this concept seems to imply explicit knowl-
edge of action-outcome statistics in the current environ-
ment. In relation to dopamine, this is consistent with 
evidence that a model-based system could potentially 
influence model-free learning and performance via the 
dopaminergic TD signal. However, implementation of 
heuristics aimed at optimizing the exploration-exploi-
tation trade-off, such as possibly instantiated in a dopa-
minergic exploration bonus, may provide a model-free 
proxy for controllability. Thus, further work is required 
to disentangle the relative contributions of model-based 
and model-free systems in modulating dopamine signals 
which, in turn, modulate defensive strategy.
We have focused on dopamine in the accumbens at 
the expense of other areas—notably the amygdala and 
mPFC—which are of clear relevance to the themes dis-
cussed. For example, intact dopamine signalling in the 
amygdala, as well as in the striatum, appears to be neces-
sary for acquisition of active avoidance behaviour [310], 
with the central nucleus particularly implicated in medi-
ating conditioned freezing responses that may interfere 
with active responding [330]. Indeed, there is evidence 
that D2 receptors are particularly prevalent in the central 
amygdala [265, 331], and a recent review [332] suggests 
that a key role of D2 receptors in the central nucleus is 
to modulate reflex-like defensive behaviours organised 
in the brain stem. This clearly relates to the proposed 
importance of D2 in modulating Pavlovian defence dis-
cussed here. Similarly, it is known that stress-induced 
increases in accumbens dopamine release is constrained 
by activation of D1 receptors in mPFC, with both mPFC 
dopamine depletion or blockade of D1 receptors leading 
to enhanced stress-induced accumbens release of dopa-
mine (see [211], and references therein). Furthermore, 
mPFC is thought to be a key player in the appraisal of 
whether a stressor is under the animal’s control [323].
Throughout the review, we have highlighted various 
issues that merit experimental and theoretical investiga-
tion. Experimentally, the most pressing issue is perhaps 
heterogeneity in the dopamine system—arriving at a 
clearer view of the potentially separate roles and activa-
tion of different groups of dopamine neurons, and rec-
onciling activation and release. Technical advances have 
allowed increasingly sophisticated attacks on this issue, 
though a consensus regarding the degree of heterogene-
ity, both in terms of activity [333, 334] and connectiv-
ity [227, 335, 336], has yet to emerge. To the extent that 
dopamine neurons with different affective receptive 
fields project to different targets, there is no need for a 
shared semantics for their activation [23]. However, if 
reward and punishment-activated dopamine neurons 
are interdigitated in the way suggested by some experi-
ments [333], then there is a need for a functional analysis 
as to how downstream systems might be able to interpret 
the apparently confusing patterns of dopamine release. 
One speculation in the former case, e.g. if dopamine 
cells in the ventral versus dorsal VTA showing differ-
ent responses to aversive stimuli [223] also differentially 
project to more ventral versus dorsal regions of striatum, 
respectively, is that this reflects competing objectives to 
(a) shape (instrumental) policy retrospectively, by assign-
ing (dis)credit to actions that may have led to aversive 
outcomes, and (b) to promote suitable (Pavlovian) behav-
iour prospectively in light of possible future safety.
Similarly, it would be important to understand the true 
degree of separation between putative direct and indirect 
pathways in the core and shell of the accumbens. Het-
erogeneity in the serotonin system, and its interactions 
with dopamine in the case of aversion, would also merit 
investigation. A recent revealing analysis of active avoid-
ance in the zebrafish, showing the critical involvement 
of a pathway linking the lateral habenula to the median 
raphe [324] is of importance, particularly since most of 
the recent studies of optogenetically tagged or manipu-
lated 5-HT neurons have focused instead on the dorsal 
raphe [329, 337–339]. Integrating the whole array of data 
on patience, satiety, motor action, behavioural inhibition 
and aversion associated with 5-HT is a major task.
From a more behavioural viewpoint, it would be inter-
esting to get a clearer view of the scope of model-based 
aversive conditioning. For instance, take the experiment 
showing that D2 blockade does not arrest learning aver-
sive predictions even though it does avoidance responses 
[311]: it is not clear why model-based predictions would 
not be capable of generating appropriate avoidance 
behaviour as soon as the D2 antagonist is washed out—
rather leaving it to be acquired slowly, as if it was purely 
model-free.
Another important experimental avenue is to try and 
integrate the processing of costs (and indeed, for humans, 
outcomes such as financial losses) with that of actual 
punishment. Costs, which could be either physical or 
mental [340–342], also exert a negative force on behav-
iour, and indeed also have a slightly complicated relation 
to dopamine activation and release [12, 16, 343, 344].
From a more theoretical viewpoint, perhaps the most 
urgent question concerns pinning down the different 
facets of controllability, the way that these determine 
operations such as exploration, and relative model-based 
and model-free influences. Entropy and reachability of 
outcomes were considered by [32], but other definitions 
are possible. Work on learned helplessness suggests a 
key role for the mPFC in suppressing otherwise exu-
berant 5-HT activity in animals who have the benefit of 
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behavioural control—but what exactly mPFC is reporting 
is unclear.
A further direction is to construct a more compre-
hensive theory of aversive vigour [252] looked at this in 
a rather specific set of experimental circumstances. The 
direct predictions arising even from this have not been 
thoroughly tested; but a more general theory, also tied to 
controllability, would be desirable.
Finally, we have noted various structural asymmetries 
between appetitive and aversive systems, ascribing many 
of them to asymmetric priors about the structure of 
rewards and punishments in environments [23]. It would 
be important to examine these claims in more detail, and 
indeed look at the effect of changing the statistics of envi-
ronments to determine the extent of lability.
In conclusion, we have attempted to use our evolv-
ing and rich view of the nature and source of learned, 
appetitive behaviour to examine the case of aversion and 
defence. Along with substantial commonalities between 
the two, we have discussed some critical differences—
notably in the way that aversive behaviour appears to 
piggy-back on appetitive processing, leading to various 
intricate complexities that are incompletely understood. 
Dopamine plays a number of critical and apparently con-
founded roles; we therefore used it to lay as bare as pos-
sible the extent and limits of our current understanding.
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